We consider a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic differential game. The timeinconsistency arises from the presence of quadratic terms of the expected state as well as state-dependent term in the objective functionals. We define an equilibrium strategy, which is different from the classical one, and derived a sufficient conditions for equilibrium strategies via a system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations. When the state is one-dimensional and the coefficients are all deterministic, we find an explicit equilibrium strategy. The uniqueness of such equilibrium strategy is given.
Introduction
Time inconsistency in dynamic decision making is often observe in social systems and daily life. Motivated by practical applications, especially in mathematical economics and finance, time-inconsistency control problems have recently attracted considerable research interest and efforts attempting to seek equilibrium, instead of optimal, controls. At a conceptual level, the idea is that a decision made by the controller at every instant of time is considered as a game against all the decisions made by the future incarnations of the controller. An "equilibrium" control is therefore one such that any deviation from it at any time instant will be worse off. The study on time inconsistency by economists can be dated back to Stroz [23] and Phelps ( [21, 22] ) in models with discrete time (see [17] and [18] for further developments), and adapted by Karp ([15, 16] ), and by Ekeland and Lazrak ( [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] ) to the case of continuous time. In the LQ control problems, Yong [24] studied a time-inconsistent deterministic model and derived equilibrium controls via some integral equations.
It is natural to study time inconsistency in the stochastic models. Ekeland and Pirvu [11] studied the non-exponential discounting which leads to time inconsistency in an agent's investment-consumption policies in a Merton model. Grenadier and Wang [12] also studied the hyperbolic discounting problem in an optimal stopping model. In a Markovian systems, Björk and Murgoci [3] proposed a definition of a general stochastic control problem with time inconsistent terms, and proposed some sufficient condition for a control to be solution by a system of integro-differential equations. They constructed some solutions for some examples including an LQ one, but it looks very hard to find not-to-harsh condition on parameters to ensure the existence of a solution. Björk, Murgoci and Zhou [4] also constructed an equilibrium for a mean-variance portfolio selection with state-dependent risk aversion. Basak and Chabakauri [1] studied the mean-variance portfolio selection problem and got more details on the constructed solution. Hu, Jin and Zhou [13, 14] studied the general LQ control problem with time inconsistent terms in a non-Markovian system and constructed an unique equilibrium for quite general LQ control problem, including a non-Markovian system.
To the best of our knowledge, most of the time-inconsistent problems are associated with the control problems though we use the game formulation to define its equilibrium. In the problems of game theory, the literatures about time inconsistency is little [2, 19] . However, the definitions of equilibrium strategies in the above two papers are based on some corresponding control problems like before. In this paper, we formulate a general stochastic LQ differential game, where the objective functional of each player include both a quadratic term of the expected state and a state-dependent term. These non-standard terms each introduces time inconsistency into the problem in somewhat different ways. We define our equilibrium via open-loop controls. Then we derive a general sufficient condition for equilibrium strategies through a system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). An intriguing feature of these FBSDEs is that a time parameter is involved; so these form a flow of FBSDEs. When the state process is scalar valued and all the coefficients are deterministic functions of time, we are able to reduce this flow of FBSDEs into several Riccati-like ODEs. Comparing to the ODEs in [13] , though the state process is scalar valued, the unknowns are matrix-valued because of two players. Therefore, such ODEs are harder to solve than those of [13] . Under some more stronger conditions, we obtain explicitly an equilibrium strategy, which turns out to be a linear feedback. We also prove that the equilibrium strategy we obtained is unique.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to the formulation of our problem and the definition of equilibrium strategy. In Section 3, we apply the spike variation technique to derive a flow of FBSEDs and a sufficient condition of equilibrium strategies. Based on this general results, we solve in Section 4 the case when the state is one dimensional and all the coefficients are deterministic. The uniqueness of such equilibrium strategy is also proved in this section.
Problem setting
Let T > 0 be the end of a finite time horizon, and let (W t ) 0≤t≤T = (W 1 t , ..., W d t ) 0≤t≤T be a d-dimensional Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω, F , P). Denote by (F t ) the augmented filtration generated by (W t ).
As in [13] , let S n be the set of symmetric n×n real matrices; L 2
F
(Ω, R l ) be the set of square-integrable random variables; L 2 F (t, T ; R n ) be the set of {F s } s∈[t,T ] -adapted square-integrable processes; and L 2 F (Ω; C(t, T ; R n )) be the set of continuous {F s } s∈[t,T ] -adapted square-integrable processes.
We consider a continuous-time, n-dimensional nonhomogeneous linear controlled system (cf. [13] )
Here A is a bounded deterministic function on 
are the controls, and X is the state process valued in R n . Finally, x 0 ∈ R n is the initial state. It is obvious that for any controls
As time evolves, we need to consider the controlled system starting from time t ∈ [0, T ] and state
We consider a two-person differential game problem. At any time t with the system state X t = x t , the i-th (i = 1, 2) person's aim is to minimize her cost (if maximize, we can times the following function by −1):
Here, for i = 1, 2, Q i and R i are both given essentially bounded adapted process on [0, T ] with values in S n and S l , respectively, G i , h i , λ i , µ i are all constants in S n , S n , R n×n and R n , respectively. Furthermore, we assume that Q i , R i are non-negative definite almost surely and G i are non-negative definite.
Given a control pair (u * 1 , u * 2 ). For any t ∈ [0, T ), ǫ > 0, and , i = 1, 2 are defined by (2.4), for any t ∈ [0, T ) and
(Ω, R l ). Remark. The "≥" in (2.5)-(2.6) because of each person want to minimize his/her cost as we claimed before. The above definition means that, in each time t, the equilibrium is a static Nash equilibrium in a corresponding game.
Sufficient conditions
Let (u * 1 , u * 2 ) be a fixed strategy pair, and let X * be the corresponding state process. For any
are the solutions to the following equations:
for i = 1, 2. From the assumption that Q i and G i are non-negative definite, it follows that P i (s; t) are nonnegative definite for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 3.1 For any t
where
Proof. Let X t,ǫ,v 1 ,v 2 be the state process corresponding to u t,ǫ,v i i , i = 1, 2. Then by standard perturbation approach (cf. [20, 13] or pp. 126-128 of [25] ), we have
Moreover, by Theorem 4.4 in [25] , we have
With A being deterministic, it follows from the dynamics of Y that, for any s ∈ [t, T ], we have
Hence we conclude that
By these estimates, we can calculate
Recalling that (p i (·; t), k i (·; t)) and (P i (·; t), K i (·; t)) solve, respectively, (3.7) and (3.8) for i = 1, 2, we have
and
Combining (3.17)-(3.19), we have
This prove (3.9), and similarly, we obtain (3.10).
Because of R i,s and P i (s; t), i = 1, 2 are non-negative definite, H i (s; t), i = 1, 2 are also non-negative definite. In view of (3.9)-(3.10), a sufficient condition for an equilibrium is 
Therefore, we have another characterization for equilibrium strategies:
Denote X * as the state process, and 
24)
then u * is an equilibrium strategy if and only if
Proof. The proof is by Lemma 3.4 of [14] and Theorem 3.4.
The following is the main general result for the time-inconsistent stochastic LQ differential game.
Theorem 3.4 A strategy pair
(u * 1 , u * 2 ) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R l ) × L 2 F (0, T ; R l )
is an equilibrium strategy pair if the following two conditions hold for any time t:
(i) The system of SDEs (3.25) .
Proof. Given a strategy pair (u
* 1 , u * 2 ) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R l ) × L 2 F (0, T ; R l )
satisfying (i) and (ii), then for any
proving the first condition of Definition 2.1, and the proof of the second condition is similar. Theorem 3.4 involve the existence of solutions to a flow of FBSDEs along with other conditions. The system (3.26) is more complicated than system (3.6) in [13] . As declared in [13] , "proving the general existence for this type of FBSEs remains an outstanding open problem", it is also true for our system (3.26).
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the case when n = 1. When n = 1, the state process X is a scalar-valued rocess evolving by the dynamics 
In this case, the adjoint equations for the equilibrium strategy become dp i (s;
for i = 1, 2. For convenience, we also state here the n = 1 version of Theorem 3.4:
is an equilibrium strategy pair if, for any time t ∈ [0, T ),
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategy when coefficients are deterministic
The unique solvability of (3.31) remains a challenging open problem even for the case n = 1. However, we are able to solve this problem when the parameters A,
and R 2 are all deterministic functions. Throughout this section we assume all the parameters are deterministic functions of t. In this case, since G 1 , G 2 has been also assumed to be deterministic, the BSDEs (3.30) turns out to be ODEs with solutions
An intuitional idea and the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy
As in classical LQ control, we attempt to look for a linear feedback equilibrium strategy pair. For such purpose, motivated by [13] , given any t ∈ [0, T ], we consider the following process: 
Comparing the dW s term of dp i (s; t) in (3.31) and (4.33), we have
Notice that k(s; t) turns out to be independent of t. Putting the above expressions (4.32) and (4.34) of p i (s; t) and k i (s; t), i = 1, 2 into (3.25), we have (4.35) for i = 1, 2. Then we can formally deduce 
and hence
38)
Next, comparing the ds term of dp i (s; t) in (3.31) and (4.33) (we supress the argument s here), we have
Notice in the above that X * = X * s and E t [X * ] = E t [X * s ] due to the omission of s. This leads to the following equations for M i , N i , Γ i , Φ i : 2 are scalars, M, N, Γ, Φ are now matrices because of two players. Therefore, the above equations are more complicated than the similar equations (4.5)-(4.8) in [13] . Before we solve the equations (4.41)-(4.44), we first prove that, if exist, the equilibrium constructed above is the unique equilibrium. Indeed, we have Theorem 4.1 Let
(4.46)
Suppose all the parameters A, 
50) and hence for i = 1, 2, dp i (s; t) = dp i (s; Finally, pluggingp ≡k ≡ 0 into u of (4.50), we get the u being the same form of feedback strategy as in (4.36), and hence (X, u 1 , u 2 ) is the same as (X * , u * 1 , u * 2 ) which we got before. 
Existence of the equilibrium strategies
Finally, once we get the solution for (M 1 , M 2 , N 1 ), (4.44) is a simple ODE. Therefore, it is crucial to solve (4.54).
Formally, we defineM =
and study the following equation for (M 1 ,M, J 1 ): In the following, we will use the truncation method to study the system (4.55). For convenienc, we use the following notations:
Moreover, for a matrix M ∈ R m×n and a real number c, we define
We first consider the standard case where R − δI 0 for some δ > 0. We have Proof. For fixed c > 0 and K > 0, consider the following truncated system of (4.55): 
Hence, Proof. Define p i (s; t) and k i (s; t) by (4.32) and (4.34), respectively. It is straightforward to check that (u * 1 , u * 2 , X * , p 1 , p 2 , k 1 , k 2 ) satisfies the system of SDEs (3.31). Moreover, in the both cases, we can check that α i,s and β i,s in (4.36) are all uniformly bounded, and hence u * i ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R l ) and X * ∈ L 2 (Ω; C(0, T ; R) Therefore, Λ i satisfies the seond condition in (3.25) .
